Crude Intentions

Unraveling the Complex Motives Behind the U.S. Invasion of Iraq

On March 17, 2003, President George W. Bush authorized military force to remove Saddam Hussein from power and topple the regime in Iraq. This action received mixed reactions, with some viewing it as a necessary armed conflict and others seeing it as a continuation of America’s pursuit of global dominance. In America’s Oil Wars, Stephen Pelletiere argues that the U.S. invaded Iraq under false pretenses, aiming to control the oil-producing regions rather than responding to security threats. He claims that the U.S. failed to exhaust all diplomatic options and was particularly provoked by Saddam’s pressure on fellow OPEC nations who were not adhering to their quotas. Despite Saddam’s history of using chemical weapons and the significant sacrifices made by America to stabilize Iraq, Pelletiere suggests that the primary motive was to dominate oil resources, a benefit that outweighs the advantages of lower oil prices.

A primary justification the United States provided for going to war was the alleged existence of hard evidence pointing to Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use weapons of mass destruction. Stephen Pelletier challenges this claim, asserting that the U.S. did not thoroughly investigate Iraq’s potential WMDs and actively hindered diplomatic efforts by weapons inspectors. In July 2002, Richard Butler, former chief of the UNSCOM weapons inspection team, informed the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he found no evidence of Iraq possessing WMDs or supplying arms to terrorist groups. Similarly, the New York Times reported, after interviews with multiple CIA agents, that the agency found no proof of Iraq engaging in terrorist activities against the U.S. for nearly a decade, nor evidence of Saddam providing WMDs to al-Qaeda or similar groups. Despite these reports, the U.S. dismissed diplomatic solutions and escalated preparations for war. Even after the Iraqi government, on September 12, 2002, accepted an ultimatum from the General Assembly allowing UN weapons inspectors back into Iraq without restrictions, the U.S. maintained that Saddam's previous obstructions to inspections violated international law, using this stance to justify continuing the oil embargo.

Reports indicate that Iraq's reluctance to allow weapons inspectors was due in part to suspicions of espionage by the US and Britain. Scott Ritter, a former weapons inspector, revealed to Newsweek that some members of his team were actually US intelligence agents tasked with gathering data on Saddam Hussein’s routines and strategic locations, and one was a British MI6 officer trying to recruit a high-level Iraqi diplomat. Ritter also observed that the facilities his team inspected were later targeted in Operation Desert Fox, a detail the Pentagon acknowledged by admitting that intelligence from UNSCOM monitors contributed to selecting bombing targets. While the media often depicted Iraq’s regime as uncooperative and defiant, these actions suggest that the United States prioritized military intervention over diplomatic efforts to achieve its political objectives.

On the other hand, the United States was not prepared to wait for Saddam Hussein to potentially conceal his weapons of mass destruction while prolonged diplomatic negotiations unfolded. Over the decade following the Gulf War, Saddam demonstrated a capacity to manipulate the weapons inspections process, delay proceedings, restrict access to crucial sites, and halt diplomatic efforts altogether. Consequently, President Bush and his advisors advocated for a rapid military strike to eliminate the perceived threat from the unstable dictator, whom the international community believed possessed WMDs. Critics, however, highlight that no WMDs were found in the three years following the invasion. Despite this, it is well-documented that Saddam previously deployed chemical weapons against the Kurds, experimented with such weapons on Iranian prisoners of war and Iraqi civilians, and used substantial quantities against Iran, even attempting similar attacks against Israel.

The potential of WMDs in the hands of a dictator like Saddam Hussein posed a significant risk, and the United States was unwilling to delay action for months or even years through diplomatic channels. Saddam's historical readiness to use WMDs was corroborated by numerous prominent Iraqi scientists, who, either through defection or capture, confirmed their involvement in secret projects to develop such weapons. Moreover, there was a concern that Saddam could provide WMDs to terrorist groups, thereby enabling quick and devastating strikes against the U.S. without direct attribution. For instance, the Ansar al-Islam terrorist organization, based in northern Iraq, reportedly tested chemical gases on animals and likely received support from the Iraqi regime in terms of funding and materials to refine these lethal capabilities. Although Ansar al-Islam is just one example, it is possible that other similar groups operated within Iraq with comparable goals. In her book The Iraq War, Raphael Israeli cites anonymous U.S. intelligence officials who claimed that agencies like the CIA and NSA had identified multiple connections between Al-Qaeda and Iraq, although much of this information remains classified and inaccessible to the public.

The absence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) found by the United States in Iraq does not definitively indicate that none existed. Saddam Hussein's historically contentious relationships with neighbors, such as Syria and Iran, where he was both an adversary and ally, complicate the scenario. After years of conflict, including a brutal eight-year war with Iran, Saddam managed to mend ties with these nations, receiving economic aid and potentially even hiding places for forbidden war materials and his family. Notably, during the U.S. invasion, Saddam relocated his aircraft to Iranian territory, concealing them beneath sand. This act lends credence to the theory that he could have also transferred WMDs to Iran for safekeeping. Given Saddam's established history of developing and utilizing chemical weapons, it remains plausible that he did not completely dismantle his arsenal.

Iraq, as one of the most oil-rich countries in the world, wields substantial political influence. The primary reasons cited for going to war included weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein's human rights violations, but less discussed was Saddam's enforcement of OPEC quotas against Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. OPEC members are expected to adhere to production quotas to maintain oil prices; however, overproduction by some members led to price drops that benefited the cheaters at the expense of others. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq faced a significant debt of $98 billion from its conflict with Iran, and the undercutting by Kuwait and UAE made debt repayment nearly impossible with oil at only $17 per barrel. In 1990, Saddam appealed to President Bush Sr. to enforce the agreed-upon OPEC prices, but his plea was dismissed, with Bush stating that he could not interfere in the economic policies of sovereign nations. Evidence suggests that the United States may have encouraged these OPEC violations for economic and political gain, contributing to Iraq’s lingering debt and distrust of America that lasted until the second invasion of Iraq. This background frames a rationale for why the U.S. was reluctant to allow Saddam to enforce quota compliance among OPEC members. Faced with plummeting oil prices and potential economic collapse, Saddam was prepared to take military action against countries violating their quotas. Given that America and Europe are heavily reliant on oil, controlling this resource in the Middle East was seen as crucial to future geopolitical power. Thus, the U.S. focused on removing Saddam Hussein, who consistently challenged American interests, to secure influence over oil prices globally.

Critics of the oil theory highlight that America primarily imports its oil from South America, not the Middle East, and argue that the financial and human costs of invading and stabilizing Iraq far outweigh the benefits of slightly lower oil prices. Estimates suggest that the total cost of stabilizing Iraq could exceed a trillion dollars—an amount deemed excessive just to influence oil markets. If control over oil production were the primary motive, proponents argue, the U.S. would have assumed direct control over Iraqi oil operations within the first three years following the invasion. Furthermore, the U.S.'s heavy reliance on oil does not justify the extensive expenditures to stabilize a country solely for this purpose. The extensive efforts and sacrifices made by American forces in Iraq often go unrecognized. An analysis of oil prices post-invasion shows no significant financial gain for the U.S. American soldiers have been deeply involved in securing chaotic regions, combating a resilient insurgency, and dismantling a violent dictatorship. Importantly, the humanitarian efforts to support the Iraqi people stand in stark contrast to the notion that the U.S. intervened solely for oil. The commitment demonstrated by American troops in their risky endeavors to provide care underlines a commitment to humanitarian values, challenging the perspective that the invasion was primarily driven by oil interests.

The second war in Iraq remains deeply controversial, with both sides presenting compelling evidence to support their perspectives. The full rationale behind the invasion may forever remain obscured by competing narratives and assumptions. Simon Pelletier argues that the war was illegally conducted, accusing the United States of exhausting insufficient diplomatic efforts and masking oil interests behind the guise of the “War on Terror” and the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. However, this view may be overly narrow. While Pelletier’s points are substantiated, he overlooks the possibility that the decision to invade could have been made in good faith, without ulterior motives. Over time, the release of currently classified documents may provide clearer insights into the motivations behind the war. Until then, it is essential to critically assess the available facts to form a reasoned understanding of this pivotal historical event.