Article Review - Authority Gap of the National Science Foundation
Review of Daniel Kleinman’s “Politics on the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States.”1
In Chapter six, ‘From Grand Vision to Puny Partner’, Daniel Kleinman focuses on the consequences of the authority gap in the five years (1945-1950) that passed between WWII and the official establishment of the National Science Foundation (NSF). Senator Harley Kilgore, a Democratic Senator from West Virginia that led the congressional committee to transition research from wartime to peacetime, had grand aspirations of establishing a benevolent American research organization that drove scientific research for the well-being of greater society. But in taking a gradual approach achieved through consensus, he was outmaneuvered by other organizations that aimed to control their own realms of influence (military, atomic energy and medicine). This five-year gap where groups were vying for authority still influences the way that scientific research is funded and promoted.
Kilgore advocated for an NSF administration and board that consisted of a varied cross-section of America that included farmers, businessman, labor union leaders, teachers and scientists, all working towards a cohesive scientific plan. The theory of having the entirety of America benefit from the research that taxpayers were funding is laudable, but does not take into account the psychology of the researchers. A scientist only thrives when they have ownership over their pursuits - Kilgore’s committee met with resistance from many scientists and engineers that were told that a board with little scientific research experience would be guiding their careers. This dragged out the time it took for the NSF to establish itself by at least three years, which provided an opening for four organizations to separate themselves: Office of Naval Research (ONR), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Joint Research and Development Board (RDB), and the National Institute of Health (NIH).
The Atomic Energy Commission, at the center of perhaps the most compelling science at the time, was the first to break off and assert its authority. The Manhattan Project, which developed the nuclear weapons that ended the war in the Pacific theatre, was well-known to virtually the entire world. As the atomic program already had significant clout amongst legislators, they advocated for autonomy and separate funding sources. The AEC even expanded into primary cancer research, as well as other energy research fields that would fall more cleanly under physics or engineering. While the AEC was succeeded by the Energy Research and Development Administration, and then consolidated into the US Department of Energy. AEC’s influence campaign in the 1940’s remains relevant, as some energy research remains independent from NSF.
The Office of Naval Research took a different approach – Unlike the AEC, which had a very visible presence, they initially argued that the military should control their own research for weaponry and defense, a valid point. However, they aggressively courted university researchers and young students and funded ‘basic’ research that other organizations ignored. By 1949, A fundamental physics conference noted that over 80% of the research presented was funded by ONR, even though most of the projects were not directly applicable to weaponry.2 Combined with the Joint Research and Development Board, which was established to coordinate scientific research between Navy and Army, both organizations leveraged their relationships with researchers to ensure their own sphere of influence. Vannevar Bush, the influential engineer and administrator that ran the Office of Scientific Research and Development (which ran nearly all wartime R&D) headed up the board and brought his influence to bear, giving the military significant clout at the expense of NSF.
There were many debates over NSF in this five year period, ranging from the mundane to the overarching. The biggest question was who should control and administer the board. Kilgore wanted a broad cross-section of social interests, but he lost many of his arguments. Internally, scientists balked at having to modify their research at the direction of board members that had never been in a scientific lab before. In a telling example, President Truman initially appointed Franklin Graham, a senator and history professor, as the head of the NSF, but rescinded the appointment after virulent criticism from scientists over the perceived political aspect. In the end, the board of the NSF consisted of all physical scientists (except one social scientist), and the head of the NSF from then on was chosen through a relatively meritocratic process. While meritocracy has value, that meant that most funding went to already well-established organizations in large cities and overlooked many of the geographical and social groups that were supposed to have a say in the research in the first place.
Kilgore’s aim in building an organization that improved society and contributed to social equity and justice is noble – but in trying to build the perfect administration, he created a leadership gap that was quickly filled by the Office of Naval Research , Atomic Energy Commission and National Institute of Health. In some ways, he failed to account for human nature and reality – scientists want as much control over their focus and the ability to pursue their own interests, not follow the direction of a board where many of the participants do not have a scientific background. He should have pushed to establish the NSF as a valid entity, even if it was just a workable shell, and then work on the details. Instead, as he attempted to build consensus, he lost control of the narrative and ended up with an organization that had already been hollowed out. Today, the NSF remains influential, but does more with facilitating, rather than driving research.