Psychological Warfare

The psychological impact of targeting civilians has been widely discussed, attempted, and executed, yielding mixed results. Throughout the battles of the 20th century, airpower emerged as the most significant technological innovation supporting Clausewitz’s theory of total war. With the introduction of the airplane, warfare evolved from conventional battles to conflicts that encompassed not just the enemy forces but also their support networks. While the psychological effects of bombing civilians proved effective in certain contexts, the shift in warfare from nation-states to non-governmental actors has compelled the United States Air Force to reevaluate its policies regarding civilian engagement. Leveraging ever-advancing technology, the USAF has moved away from the traditional concept of total war and instead concentrated on inflicting psychological effects directly on the enemy. The use of aircraft in military operations began during World War I. While technology was still in its infancy, aviators like Billy Mitchell and Eddie Rickenbacker recognized that a twenty-minute flight could achieve what armies took months to accomplish on the ground. Many nations underestimated the potential of aircraft in military operations, and it would be years before airplanes were utilized for anything beyond their traditional roles of reconnaissance and artillery spotting. Ironically, the Wright brothers envisioned the airplane as a symbol of peace, hoping it would put an end to global conflict. Little did they know that their invention would usher in a new era of brutal warfare. John Buckley noted, “The twentieth century saw the advent of so-called ‘total war,’ and aircraft were to play a significant role in developing the totality of conflict… Air power provided the means to attack enemy populations directly, creating huge ethical and moral problems.” The involvement of civilian populations in warfare raised profound moral questions. Giulio Douhet, perhaps the most controversial theorist on airpower, advocated for the direct targeting of enemy civilians as a means to expand the concept of total war. His strategy called for air superiority to be established first, followed by relentless attacks on civilian populations to undermine their will and support for their political leaders. One of Douhet’s core beliefs was that noncombatants could replace soldiers in sustaining national morale. He argued that the civilian population was a crucial target because their support enabled the military to continue operations. Without the backing of the people, political leaders would lose credibility, the military would falter in its commitment to the nation, and civilians might rise against their leaders, plunging the enemy nation into chaos. Douhet believed that sacrificing the lives of enemy civilians could save thousands of friendly troops, arguing that the moral justification and overall outcome outweighed the loss of civilian lives. While many of Douhet’s ideas were extreme and never fully realized, they reflected a growing sentiment in favor of expanding the concept of total war. In contrast, Hugh Trenchard, who led the RAF during the interwar period, challenged several of Douhet’s theories. Having witnessed the rise of technology and the evolution of total war, Trenchard advocated for a more rational approach to warfare, one that did not necessitate the destruction of an entire generation. He considered targeting civilians themselves to be immoral, but believed that striking industries employing civilian workers was a legitimate military objective. For example, Trenchard supported bombing airfields and providing strong close air support while targeting key infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and railroads. He also proposed the destruction of iron mines and factories producing steel, chemicals, and aircraft to further cripple the enemy's military capabilities. Initially, Trenchard suggested bombing factories during off-peak hours to minimize civilian casualties. Historically, Trenchard earned a reputation for cold-heartedness due to his focus on targeting German cities, albeit without directly aiming at civilians. He famously argued that Napoleon was mistaken in believing the psychological effects of bombing outweighed the material damage at a ratio of 4 to 1; Trenchard believed the true ratio was closer to 20 to 1. His strategy involved randomly bombing factories in Germany to undermine the morale of the German populace. He aimed to instill a sense of insecurity among workers, making them feel unsafe in their jobs, which would lead to distraction and decreased efficiency. Unlike Douhet, Trenchard did not anticipate that bombing factories would incite a revolt; instead, he believed it would simply render the workforce preoccupied and less productive. However, due to the challenges of accurate targeting in adverse weather and during night operations, this tactic often resulted in the indiscriminate bombing of civilians within cities. World War I served as a training ground for aerial operations, but many of the tactics proposed, including the bombing of civilians, were primarily implemented during World War II. The Zeppelin bombings of London marked the world’s first glimpse of total, unconditional war involving civilians. In reality, the slow, low-flying airships used by the Germans to undermine British morale were largely ineffective. While the attacks resulted in 1,400 British casualties, they caused minimal damage to English infrastructure and had little to no impact on the economy or military capabilities. However, the Zeppelin raids did succeed in instilling fear among the English people, shaking their sense of security that had long rested on the belief that they were safely removed from the conflict. The British could no longer view themselves as entirely insulated from war; the looming threat of aerial attacks meant that their safety was now precarious. Their sense of invulnerability had been shattered, leading to widespread panic that bordered on hysteria. The Germans miscalculated, believing their assaults would erode civilian support for the war and its political leaders. Instead, the opposite occurred: the civilians of London rallied for increased anti-aircraft defenses and air protection, demonstrating resilience in the face of fear. Another response from the British was an intensified commitment to the war and a demand for vengeance through the bombing of German cities. Previously, England had used its aircraft primarily to support ground forces, but Germany had opened the door to attacking civilians without any genuine military necessity. In hindsight, the tactics employed by the Germans proved ineffective, yet the ensuing hysteria in England hinted at the potential consequences of targeting civilians, which could undermine morale and support for the war. The firebombing of Dresden by the RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth Air Force stands as one of the most controversial episodes of the European theater in World War II. Before the bombings of 1945, the city had experienced only minimal attacks, largely because it housed several military targets, including a glass factory, an optical factory, a radar and electronics center, and artillery factories. These facilities employed over 10,000 people and contributed significantly to the German military effort. Additionally, Dresden's cultural center rivaled that of any major city in Europe, boasting numerous museums, art galleries, and restaurants. The initial objective of the bombing campaign was to destroy the city's transportation infrastructure and various factories. However, due to inclement weather and strong winds, the intended targets became obscured, leading to indiscriminate bombing. The incendiary bombs ignited homes and other structures, and fueled by the fierce winds, they created a devastating firestorm. This inferno raged for hours, ultimately claiming an estimated 35,000 to 135,000 lives. The reasons behind the notoriety of this bombing campaign remain uncertain. In the raids on Tokyo alone, up to 90,000 people perished, with thousands more killed in various bombing campaigns across Europe. Perhaps the controversy surrounding this firebombing stems from its representation of the annihilation of entire populations and their histories. Men, women, and children lost their lives in their homes or on the streets, oblivious to the chaos unfolding around them. The devastation extended beyond workers; it engulfed entire families. Museums housing some of the world's most renowned artwork were obliterated, leaving only remnants of a lost generation. Dresden epitomized the concept of total war, a conflict that transcended traditional combatants and ravaged all of civilization in its wake. Among the most notorious instances of airpower used against civilians are the United States Air Force's deployment of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These bombs unleashed an almost unimaginable level of destruction, obliterating the cities and claiming countless Japanese lives. The final death toll from the Hiroshima bombing in 1945 was estimated at 129,588, while the records from Nagasaki indicate well over 100,000 casualties, not including the long-term effects of radiation. At first glance, this appears to be a stark violation of the principle of proportionality. Many countries today view the United States as a primary offender against the rules established by the Geneva Convention. Indeed, several American history teachers in high schools and colleges have labeled the bombings of these two cities as acts of terrorism perpetrated by a first-world nation. However, there is more to this situation than initially assumed. The Japanese soldiers were highly disciplined, and rather than surrender and bring shame to their families, they were prepared to fight American soldiers to the death. Desperation leads to desperate measures, and although they faced certain defeat against the ever-advancing United States military, their soldiers fought with a ferocity that posed significant danger to US forces. The Japanese admiration for their Kamikaze pilots illustrated the lengths they were willing to go to defend their nation and family name. While the Japanese were outnumbered and outmatched, and vulnerable to any type of siege due to a lack of natural resources, they were aware that they could sustain themselves for several months and thwart the United States from achieving a complete victory. The US also understood that to end the conflict in the Pacific, they would be compelled to conduct an all-out amphibious landing on Tokyo and seize the island. The Japanese defenses in this region were formidable, and the United States understood that conducting this perilous mission would result in the loss of thousands of troops. On August 6, 2005, President Truman ordered the dropping of Little Boy on Hiroshima. Three days later, he authorized the deployment of Fat Man over Nagasaki. Even Curtis LeMay was unaware of the atomic weapon's true power, and the extensive destruction it caused raised eyebrows around the globe. Despite the significant civilian casualties, Japan surrendered to the Allies shortly after the second atomic bomb was dropped. While many unarmed civilians lost their lives, John Buckley argues, “…prior to the events of August 6-9, there was little likelihood of a realistic surrender being negotiated. Consequently, the USA was justified in using all reasonable methods to end the war.” Similar to the bombings of Dresden, the atomic attacks were preceded by conventional bombings that had already resulted in high casualties. Moral questions emerge when considering that the attack occurred without a clear military target. While the cities housed factories and played a significant role in the war effort, the bomb was dropped on the city itself, not on a specific industry or military installation. When Truman ordered the bombing, he understood that thousands of civilians would lose their lives; the focus was on the civilian population rather than enemy combatants. Although the destruction caused by the atomic bombs may not have been more devastating than other conventional bombings, in this instance, the civilian population was the primary target. Conflicts like WWI, WWII, Korea, and, to some extent, Vietnam involved superpowers and nation-states that supported their own armed forces. Most battles were conventional, and the bombing of civilians was deemed effective, particularly in the context of Japan’s surrender following the atomic bombings. Each nation felt a profound duty to protect its citizens, and through industry, the economy, and the draft, civilians were closely intertwined with the military. It was generally assumed that civilians supported their armed forces and government during these times. However, the United States has recently engaged in three distinct conflicts—namely the Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq—where civilian populations did not fully support their government and were largely disengaged from the causes at hand. In these cases, the lack of civilian backing has diminished the necessity for psychological bombing and raised concerns about its effectiveness in achieving desired outcomes. In late 1990, the United States issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein, demanding that he withdraw his forces from Kuwait. After the deadline passed without compliance, the United States intervened to liberate Kuwait and subsequently entered Iraq. The United States could have easily bombed Iraqi civilians, devastating cities like Baghdad, Tikrit, and Fallujah in a manner reminiscent of World War II. However, such actions would likely have had dire consequences. For years, Saddam Hussein had withheld food from his people, gassed the Northern Kurds, executed political opponents with brutal efficiency, and used civilians as pawns in his propaganda efforts. While a segment of the Sunni minority supported Hussein, the majority of Shiites and other ethnic and religious groups did not share his allegiance. Had the United States indiscriminately targeted cities and civilians, it is probable that the Iraqi populace would have united against the American invaders, forming a formidable resistance. Instead, the U.S. focused its attacks on military targets, such as surface-to-air missile sites and enemy units, while striving to minimize civilian casualties. Although some losses were unavoidable, the U.S. managed to engage the enemy without escalating the conflict into total war. A notable instance during Operation Desert Storm involved U.S. Air Force intelligence identifying numerous operational Iraqi SAM sites along the southern border. Recognizing the potential for significant damage to their fighter aircraft from anti-aircraft weapons, the USAF deployed a fleet of unmanned drones designed to mimic real aircraft on Iraqi radar. These drones were flown toward surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites as if preparing for an attack. When the sites activated their radar systems, bomber aircraft launched anti-radiation missiles, effectively neutralizing the SAM threats. The sheer power of the USAF's strategic strike capability instilled such fear in the Iraqi SAM operators that many chose to disable their systems and abandon their posts. In this scenario, technology demonstrated its ability to accurately target the enemy and undermine their will to fight, all while safeguarding civilian lives and reducing risks to pilots. By carefully managing the scope of the conflict, the US minimized the chances of civilian backlash. Had they opted for indiscriminate bombing across the countryside, they might have destroyed a significant number of SAM sites but would have likely faced widespread condemnation from the global community. Engaging civilians in the context of war is a perilous endeavor that requires the utmost caution. Many factors come into play, including the relationship between citizens and their leaders, the nature of the war being fought, and the actual effectiveness of bombing campaigns. In London during World War I, the Germans discovered that targeting civilians could incite uprisings and demands for retribution. This strategy quickly turned against them, as they found themselves on the defensive, battling a motivated military fueled by a desire for revenge. England's response during WWI exemplifies how a strong nation-state can rally behind its government’s mission. Another critical factor was the lack of a decisive attack. The Germans were unable to strike with sufficient force to paralyze the British, which meant they lost the element of surprise. In contrast, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki compelled the Japanese government to surrender, driven by the imminent threat of total annihilation of their cities. U.S. officials had contemplated dropping as many as five atomic bombs, which would have decimated a significant portion of Japan's industry and population. Although the Japanese were fiercely committed to their cause, the sheer magnitude of the attacks rendered their current course of action unsustainable. The circumstances they faced were markedly different from those seen in contemporary conflicts, yet both scenarios highlight the vastly different responses that can arise from targeting civilians. The technological advantage of the U.S. Air Force has enabled precise targeting, significantly reducing the risk of civilian casualties. With the use of laser-guided bombs, satellite imagery, and GPS, the U.S. Air Force possesses a distinct edge in dismantling enemy assets. However, this advanced technology comes with its own set of expectations. Many now anticipate that the United States will conduct warfare with zero friendly casualties, no civilian losses, and minimal enemy fatalities. While this goal is admirable, it remains impractical. War is inherently violent, and losses are inevitable. However, as the United States has enhanced its technological capabilities, enemy civilians often believe they are safe from the U.S. Air Force, even when they support adversaries. Additionally, various studies indicate that pilots conducting bombing missions near civilian areas are as worried about facing military investigations and potential punishment as they are about being shot down. In many ways, the U.S. has become so politically correct that it jeopardizes the safety of its own troops. As Stalin famously remarked, “A single death is a tragedy; a million deaths is a statistic.” It is crucial for the U.S. military to recognize that casualties are an unfortunate reality of war. While they should be avoided whenever possible, military necessity must take precedence. In the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the war on terror presents new challenges for airpower. Precision strikes with light bombs can now target specific sections of a building, while gunfire can be directed at precise targets from an AC-130 operating thousands of feet above. Satellite imagery offers unparalleled intelligence. However, as technology advances, the United States will be compelled to further minimize civilian casualties, sacrificing the ability to strike at points of civilian morale due to the fear of public backlash. In response, the U.S. military will continue to refine its policies, aiming to win wars as swiftly as possible by shifting the psychological tactics previously aimed at civilians onto the enemy itself. Extensive area bombing runs will become a thing of the past; cities will no longer be attacked without clear military necessity, and the era of unrestricted air operations is coming to an end. Air power will increasingly focus on specific tasks, emphasizing close air support and interdiction campaigns that demand precision.